Operation Sadejstvo
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| Sadejstvo 93' | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Bosnian War | |||||||
 Operation Sadejstvo 93 | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 Army of Republika Srpska |
 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Momir Talić Novica Simić | Unknown | ||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
| Unknown | Unknown | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 10.000[1] | 12.000[2] | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| Unknown | Unknown | ||||||
Operation Sadejstvo 93 is the code name for the operation of the Army of Republika Srpska in the summer of 1993, in Bosanska Posavina. The operation is also known as the battle for the "Strujni Corridor".
Prelude[edit]
Since the stable and adequate electricity supply of Bosnian Krajina was threatened due to the state of war, the VRS decided to expand the corridor near Brčko in order to include and repair the electric line that passed through the villages of Brod, Donja Brka, Kolonija, Lipovac, Đukići and Bajići.[3]
In the operation, the VRS engaged units of the 1st Krajina Corps and the East Bosnian Corps, divided into two tactical groups. The first tactical group (TG-1) relied on the Garda Panteri, the special detachment "Peša" of the 1st Posavina Brigade, the 4th Battalion of the 43rd Prijedor Mtbr, as well as parts of the elite 1st Battalion of the Military Police;[4] TG-1 advanced in the direction of s. Brod and s. Mustache. The second tactical group (TG-2) was led by the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade and the 5th Kozar lpbr[3] in the direction of s. Bajići, s. Lipovac and s. Djukići. An armored battalion of the First Armored Brigade also participated in the operation; artillery support was provided by the 1st and 3rd mixed artillery regiments.
The ARBiH relied on the following brigades during the operation: 21st Srebrenik Brigade, 108th Motorized Brigade and 108th HVO Brigade; all together 12,000 soldiers.[3] The advantage of the defense was reflected in the terrain impassable by tanks (intertwined with canals) and flat area (easy control of enemy infantry attacks). This meant that the armor and maneuverability of the elite infantry units, one of the main strengths of the VRS —was of little or no use from the start.[5] In addition, the VRS could not use the great superiority in artillery due to the density of the enemy's defense (the length of the front was about 15 kilometers, which means that the ARBiH had almost one man per meter in defense); high density allowed defense in depth, that is, more lines. On the other hand, the basic handicap of the ARBiH was the lack of heavy weapons (about 6,000 soldiers only possessed infantry weapons), which condemned the ARBiH to leave the initiative to the attacker in the plains.
Offensive[edit]
The operation lasted seven days, from July 20 to 27, and ended successfully. During the first few days of the operation, the advance of VRS forces was weak. The turning point occurred on July 24, when special units of the VRS broke through the Muslim positions and occupied the villages of Brod and Lipovac.[6] By July 27 and the end of the operation, the VRS conquered the following places: Dizdaruša, Brod, Kolonija, Lipovac, Omerbegovača and Brk. Thus, the current corridor was secured.
References[edit]
Literature[edit]
- Žigić, Radmila. Peša. Jedna Ratna Legenda. Beograd 1995.
- Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. Washington. 1, 2.